(pagina 2)

... me to haunt the military later. However, any impact that it might have will play out more in terms of the war on terror rather than security of nuclear weapons, which are supervised by segments of the military friendly to the US.

The fact that senior Pakistani generals continue to support the US remains the primary guarantee for the US for the security of the nuclear arsenal. These senior officers are not religious ideologues. And those reputed to be religiously motivated have not held on to power: the former head of the ISI, Mehmood Ahmed—whose strong religious commitment was described by General Musharraf in his memoir—was one of the first to be demoted under American pressure after 9/11, as was his deputy chief of army staff, Muzaffar Hussain Usmani. The military at large depends on capital inflows from the west to keep its toys running and to buy new ones as well—its officers can certainly be depended upon to keep religious zealots away from the nuclear weapons. Moreover, the senior echelons of Pakistan’s military and the SPD have by now acquired enough knowledge of nuclear deterrence to understand that proliferation of nuclear weapons technology to other countries, especially next-door neighbours, does not benefit Pakistan strategically. The current generation of generals is different from the proliferators, who probably believed they were building an independent power bloc.

If the worst came to worst, could the US detect and destroy each of Pakistan's nuclear warheads and its static and mobile missile launchers? Launching a direct attack would not be at all easy. A better option would be to encourage greater accountability and transparency. A better disciplined Pakistani military would prove a greater guarantee against any deliberate or inadvertent proliferation, or mishandling of the country’s strategic assets.